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HUMAN RIGHTS THE “ASEAN WAY”: 
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A 
REGIONAL ADR AND ADJUDICATIVE BODY IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Mariam Sarwar* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With regards to international human rights law, academics have 
described Asia as a “black hole,”1 or “the last frontier”2 in regional 
human rights cooperation, and perhaps with good reason. Whereas 
Europe, Africa, and the Americas have had regional legal systems for 
human rights enforcement for years, Asia has yet to establish a 
concrete and legally binding regional mechanism to redress human 
rights violations. This may, however, be poised to change. Within the 
last decade, the Association of Southeast Asian3 Nations (“ASEAN” 
or “Association”) has increasingly made human rights a priority in 
their regional operations. The Association created a human rights 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA; B.A., Anthropology 
and Psychology, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, MI. With sincere thanks to Professor Mary 
Hansel for her guidance, Professor Hiro Aragaki for his feedback, Professor Lauren Willis for her 
support, the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work in editing this 
Note, and my family for their love and encouragement.   
 1. Nicholas Doyle, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Implications of Recent 
Southeast Asian Initiatives in Human Rights Institution-Building and Standard-Setting, 63 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 67, 70 (2014) (“When considering the architecture of the international human rights 
system, Asia seems to be something of a ‘black hole’.”). 
 2. Ben Saul et al., The Last Frontier of Human Rights Protection: Interrogating Resistance 
to Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 18 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 23, 23–24 (2011) (“While 
regional mechanisms for human rights protection were established in Europe in 1950, the Americas 
from 1959, Africa from 1981, and among Arab States from 2004, the Asia-Pacific has long been 
the last frontier of regional cooperation.”). 
 3. Hao Duy Phan, a legal expert in international law, has described “Southeast Asia” as 
geographically comprising of “the area south of China and to the east and southeast of India, 
covering the continental Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Singapore, and Malaysia) and archipelagic Southeast Asia (Malaysian Sabah, Brunei, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Timor-Leste).” Hao Duy Phan, A Selective Approach to Establishing a Human 
Rights Mechanism in Southeast Asia: The Case for a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights, in 
29 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MONOGRAPH SERIES 2 n.8 (Roger S. Clark 
eds., 2012). 
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commission in 2009, adopted a human rights declaration in 2012, and 
has begun to develop initiatives with member state judiciaries to 
improve human rights enforcement in domestic courts.4 
The primary roadblock to ASEAN’s regional human rights 
development has been its adherence to an ideology known as the 
“ASEAN Way,” which is enshrined in many of ASEAN’s legal 
instruments and continues to shape the ways in which member states 
interact with each other. The “ASEAN Way” is primarily 
characterized by the principle of non-interference—states are highly 
deferent to domestic sovereignty, reluctant to meddle in the internal 
affairs of other member states, and can only enact change with the 
consensus of all members.5 Though this ideology has served to 
maintain a level of peace and harmony amongst ASEAN states, it has 
also fostered an environment in which ASEAN members do not hold 
each other accountable for human rights violations. 
For example, ASEAN has hardly even condemned the ongoing 
Rohingya crisis within the member state of Myanmar, let alone taken 
steps to stop the persecution and exile of the Rohingya population.6 
ASEAN’s actions (or lack thereof) in the face of human rights 
violations in the region highlights the persistent nature of the “ASEAN 
Way,” and reinforces the need for an examination into how ASEAN 
can improve their mechanisms for addressing human rights violations. 
This Note explores ways in which ASEAN can strengthen its 
legal capacity to provide redress for human rights violations in 
Southeast Asia, and proposes that Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
 4. See Yvonne Xin Wang, Contextualizing Universal Human Rights: An Integrated Human 
Rights Framework for ASEAN, 25 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 385, 387 (2015); Council of ASEAN 
Chief Justices (CACJ), PEJABAT KETUA PENDAFTAR MAHKAMAH, PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA 
[Chief Registrar’s Office of the Court, Federation of Malaysia], 
http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/ms/mengenai-kami/hubungan-kehakiman-antarabangsa/council-
asean-chief-justices-cacj (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
 5. Phan, supra note 3, at 113. 
 6. See, e.g., Anis Shakirah Mohd Muslimin, ASEAN’s Rohingya Response: Barely a Peep 
Outside of Malaysia, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
anismuslimin/2017/12/17/aseans-rohingya-response-barely-a-peep-outside-of-
malaysia/#1ad7d65939de; JC Gotinga, ASEAN Summit Silence on Rohingya ‘an Absolute 
Travesty’, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/asean-summit-
silence-rohingya-absolute-travesty-171114211156144.html; John Chalmers, Southeast Asia 
Summit Draft Statement Skips Over Rohingya Crisis, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2017, 8:13 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit-myanmar/southeast-asia-summit-draft-
statement-skips-over-rohingya-crisis-idUSKBN1DD0CP. 
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(ADR) is a promising and realistic means for the Association to 
improve its human rights enforcement. 
Part II of this Note discusses ASEAN as an organization and 
outlines the two interconnected ideologies which pervade ASEAN’s 
actions and severely stagnate its ability to protect human rights. Part 
III evaluates some of ASEAN’s key human rights instruments and 
initiatives for the purpose of outlining deficiencies that merit changing 
to better protect human rights in member states. Finally, Part IV 
discusses how ASEAN can strengthen its legal ability to address 
human rights violations through alternative dispute resolutions, with 
the ultimate goal of establishing a regional human rights court to 
provide binding adjudicative decisions. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
ASEAN was first established in 1967 when Indonesia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand signed the Association into 
existence through the Bangkok Declaration.7 ASEAN membership 
grew over the years to include Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos 
and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.8 The Association was 
largely created as a security entity, both to prevent the proliferation of 
communist ideology in the region and to solidify alliances amongst 
the member states, many of whom were newly independent or in the 
process of decolonizing after years of oppressive colonial rule.9 
According to the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, the main aims of the 
Association were to “accelerate the economic growth, social progress 
and cultural development in the region,” as well as to promote 
“regional peace and stability” and “active collaboration and mutual 
assistance.”10 
 
 7. Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, I.L.M. 1233, 
1233 (1967) [hereinafter ASEAN Declaration]. The ASEAN Declaration is also known as the 
Bangkok Declaration. 
 8. ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT YOU NEED TO 
KNOW: ASEAN 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION, A COMPENDIUM 4 (2017), 
http://asean.org/storage/2017/08/12.-July-2017-AICHR-What-You-Need-to-Know-Compendium-
FINAL.pdf 
 9. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION: 
A LEGAL ANALYSIS, 2, (2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/asean/asean-human-rights-
declaration-legal-analysis-2014.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 10. ASEAN Declaration, supra note 7, at 1234. 
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A.  The ASEAN Way 
At its inception, ASEAN did not purport to have any mandate 
regarding the protection of human rights in Southeast Asia.11 To the 
contrary, member states pledged to uphold principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal state affairs.12 This 
ideology was officially enshrined as a “guiding principle for 
ASEAN”13 with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia in 1976.14 Article 2 of the treaty reads: 
 
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting 
Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental 
principles: 
 
(a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all 
nations; 
 
(b) The right of every State to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion or coersion [sic]; 
 
(c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
 
(d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
 
(e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
 
(f) Effective cooperation among themselves.15 
 
Though not explicitly stated as such in the treaty, this ideology 
has become widely known as the “ASEAN Way” and is considered 
 
 11. Yuval Ginbar, Human Rights in ASEAN—Setting Sail or Treading Water?, 10 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 504, 505–06 (2010) (“When Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand 
established ASEAN in 1967, regional stability and economic cooperation were at the forefront of 
both their motives and declared aims. To a large extent this remains the case today. Human rights, 
on the other hand, were not even mentioned in ASEAN’s constitutive Declaration.”). 
 12. Phan, supra note 3, at 108–09. 
 13. Id. at 108. 
 14. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 27 I.L.M. 610 (1988). 
 15. Id. at art. 2. 
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“the oldest and most important norm adopted and internalized by 
ASEAN states which has been central to the conduct of ASEAN 
relations so far.”16 
Given the historical context in which ASEAN was conceived, this 
approach made sense—in the aftermath of colonial intervention and 
the Cold War, member states sought to maintain control over their 
nations while facing ongoing threats of external encroachment, border 
disputes, and internal secessionism.17 However, the “ASEAN Way” 
also favored those ASEAN state governments still exercising 
autocratic rule and arguably made it even easier for human rights 
violations within the region to go unaddressed. 
B.  Dissonance Between the “ASEAN Way” and Human Rights 
According to Dr. Hao Duy Phan, a legal expert in international 
law, the “ASEAN Way” represents a vestige of traditional village 
decision-making processes and is characterized by four main 
elements: “(1) respect for the internal affairs of other members; (2) 
non-confrontation and quiet diplomacy; (3) non-recourse to use or 
threat to use of force; and (4) decision-making through consensus, 
which is unique to ASEAN.”18 The “ASEAN Way” ideology has been 
successful in certain respects for the Association, as it helped to 
maintain stability in the region, reduce conflicts, strengthen 
cooperation, and build trust among the member states.19 The amity 
furnished by adherence to this principle, in turn, allowed for ASEAN 
to focus their efforts on economic development and attracting foreign 
investment.20 
In terms of human rights, however, the “ASEAN Way” is 
inherently problematic. By following tenets of non-confrontation and 
“quiet diplomacy,” states are dissuaded from criticizing the policies or 
actions of other states.21 ASEAN states are thus reluctant to hold each 
 
 16. Doyle, supra note 1, at 71; Phan, supra note 3, at 108. 
 17. Amrita Kapur, Asian Values v. The Paper Tiger: Dismantling the Threat to Asian Values 
Posed by the International Criminal Court, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1059, 1063 (2013); see also 
Phan, supra note 3, at 114 (“[‘The ASEAN Way’] was relevant during the Cold War period when 
security was traditionally defined as security of territory from external aggression or as protection 
of national interests in foreign policy.”). 
 18. Phan, supra note 3, at 113. 
 19. Id. at 114. 
 20. Daniel Aguirre & Irene Pietropaoli, Human Rights Protection the ASEAN Way: Non-
Intervention and the Newest Regional Rights System, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 276, 278 (2012). 
 21. Phan, supra note 3, at 113–14. 
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other accountable for the numerous human rights abuses committed 
within the region.22 This, coupled with ineffective domestic remedies 
to address human rights violations, gives victims of human rights 
abuses few avenues of recourse for their plights.23 
Furthermore, ASEAN’s requirements of a consensus for 
decision-making essentially amounts to giving each member state veto 
authority, such that “ASEAN decisions could not be adopted if even 
one member country consistently rejects it.”24 This severely hinders 
ASEAN’s decision-making process, particularly because “[d]iverse 
political, cultural, and economic positions within the region make 
forming consensus around norms difficult.”25 Thus, despite the 
stability that adherence to the “ASEAN Way” brought to Southeast 
Asia for the newly-independent member states, the principle as a 
whole does not facilitate the establishment of external legally-binding 
mechanisms enforceable within each state’s domestic legal system. 
C.  Resistance to the Rise of Human Rights in Asia 
Human rights law gained increasing international support in the 
1990s, culminating in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action at the World Conference of Human Rights in 1993 which 
reasserted the need for states to promote and protect human rights.26 
The declaration states: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, 
 
 22. See Hien Bui, The ASEAN Human Rights System: A Critical Analysis, 11 ASIAN J. COMP. 
L. 111, 114 (2016) (“ASEAN has been consistently unenthusiastic in reacting to violations 
committed by its member states, choosing to ‘remain[] silent’ and ‘powerless’ in the face of the 
many human rights abuses in the region.”). 
 23. See Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 20, at 281–82. 
 24. Phan, supra note 3, at 114. 
 25. Wang, supra note 4, at 398. 
 26. G.A. Res. 48/121, (Feb. 14, 1994). 
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to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.27 
Around the same time that the international human rights 
movement was gaining momentum in the West, a new opposing 
ideology began to gain popularity in parts of Asia. What became 
known as the “Asian Values” theory was largely a form of resistance 
to what was deemed to be an imposition of Western human rights 
norms on Asia.28 The debate about “Asian Values” was “shaped by 
the juxtaposition of cultural relativism against developmental 
universalism and ‘Western’ human rights.”29 The ideology espoused 
that allegedly “Asian” beliefs and values were incompatible with 
“Western” ideas of human rights, and that the attempt to spread 
“Western” values was a “modern extension of imperialism.”30 
According to Dr. Chang-Yau Hoon, a professor and researcher 
specializing in Asian studies, the rise of the “Asian Values” debate 
occurred because Asia’s economic prosperity at the time bolstered 
enough confidence in the region to challenge the Western hegemony. 
Moreover, many countries in the region still harbored a deep-seated 
resentment against the West for decades of colonialist rule and 
oppression in the region.31 
Hoon describes four main beliefs that underpin the “Asian 
Values” ideology: 1) Human rights are not universal and thus cannot 
be universally applied. The form that human rights take depends on 
“particular social, economic, cultural and political conditions”; 2) 
society should focus on the family rather than the individual, thereby 
justifying the view that the interest of the country (as a “family”) can 
and should override that of a single citizen; 3) social and economic 
rights take precedence over the rights of the individual; and 4) part of 
a country’s right to self-determination is the ability to exercise 
 
 27. ASEAN, ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION AND THE PHNOM PENH STATEMENT OF 
THE ADOPTION OF THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION (AHRD), art. 7, (2012), 
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf [hereinafter 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration]. 
 28. Chang Yau Hoon, Revisiting the ‘Asian Values’ Argument Used by Asian Political 
Leaders and Its Validity, 32 INDONESIAN Q. 154, 154–55 (2004) (“After the end of the Cold War, 
the United States had enlarged its scope of democracy and the promotion of human rights in its 
foreign policy. This universalistic claim of human rights was seen by the economically dynamic 
and increasingly self-assertive East Asian regimes as an ideological compliment to Western 
domination.”). 
 29. Kapur, supra note 17, at 1063. 
 30. Saul et al., supra note 2, at 30. 
 31. Hoon, supra note 28, at 155. 
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domestic jurisdiction over human rights without outside 
interference.32 
These ideas were most vocally championed by former Malaysian 
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and former Singaporean 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.33 In a famous interview with journalist 
and CNN anchor Fareed Zakaria, Yew stated: 
Asian societies are unlike Western ones. The fundamental 
difference between Western concepts of society and 
government and East Asian concepts . . . is that Eastern 
societies believe that the individual exists in the context of 
his family. He is not pristine and separate. The family is part 
of the extended family, and then friends and the wider 
society.34 
Yew criticized democracy as leading to “undisciplined and disorderly 
conditions which are inimical to development,” and boasted that 
Eastern cultures maintained order by placing more value in economic 
growth and national security than human rights.35 
Indeed, the “Asian Values” ideology supported paternalistic 
forms of state authority in which “a nation is like a big family, the 
government is seen as the unchallengeable ‘father’ who is obliged to 
exercise both the disciplinarian and custodial roles, and the society is 
deemed to be the children who ought to obey the father in all 
circumstances.”36 As a consequence of this paternalistic leadership, 
however, states were able to justify intrusive and oppressive policies 
in the name of the greater good of the nation, and to keep 
governmental affairs largely shrouded in secrecy and thus vulnerable 
to corruption.37 In contrast to what were deemed to be essential “Asian 
Values”—consensus, harmony, unity and community—the “Asian 
Values” movement largely served as an ideological tool to validate 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. MICHAEL D. BARR, CULTURAL POLITICS AND ASIAN VALUES: THE TEPID WAR 3–4 
(Routledge 2002). 
 34. Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, FOREIGN AFF., 
Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 109, 113. 
 35. Ishaan Tharoor, What Lee Kuan Yew Got Wrong About Asia, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/23/what-lee-
kuan-yew-got-wrong-about-asia/?utm_term=.428c51153714. 
 36. Hoon, supra note 28, at 156–57. 
 37. Id. at 160. 
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authoritarian rule and insulate states from criticism for human rights 
violations.38 
The idea of “Asian Values” was “largely discredited” and ceased 
to be a driving force in Asian politics “after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis exposed the fragility of some [Asian] governments.”39 However, 
the effects of the “Asian Values” ideology remain enshrined in 
ASEAN’s actions relating to human rights, as tensions endure between 
ASEAN’s “[c]ollectivist notions of rights” and “western societies’ 
individualist framework.”40 “Asian Values” ideas are still adopted by 
some ASEAN countries to justify human rights abuses.41 
In summary, the “Asian Values” ideology fell in line with the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention espoused by the 
“ASEAN Way”: “Asian Values” effectively contributed to the 
“ASEAN Way” ideology and helped to create an opposition between 
the principle of non-intervention and that of universal human rights. 
Together, the “ASEAN Way” and “Asian Values” ideals severely 
stagnated ASEAN’s willingness to adopt human rights norms. 
In the midst of the rise of human rights initiatives and the “Asian 
Values” debate, the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights 
Commission began to pass resolutions pressuring states in Asia to 
establish a regional mechanism for human rights.42 Under this 
mounting international scrutiny, ASEAN finally added human rights 
to its agenda in 1993.43 
At the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers agreed to “consider the establishment of an 
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.”44 However, they 
undermined this reluctant concession by reasserting the familiar norms 
which underpin the “ASEAN Way”: “[The Foreign Ministers] 
emphasized that the protection and promotion of human rights in the 
 
 38. Id. at 155–56. 
 39. Tharoor, supra note 35. 
 40. James Gomez & Robin Ramcharan, Evaluating Competing “Democratic” Discourses: 
The Impact on Human Rights Protection in Southeast Asia, 33 J. CURRENT SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
AFF., no. 3, 2014, at 49, 54. 
 41. Phan, supra note 3, at 79 (“Countries such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam 
still rely on [the “Asian Values”] idea to counter criticisms of their human rights records, or argue 
against what they call Western imposition of human rights values.”). 
 42. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/168 (Dec. 18, 1990); G.A. Res. 43/140 (Dec. 8, 1988); G.A. Res. 
41/153 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
 43. Phan, supra note 3, at 2. 
 44. Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (July 23–24, 1993), 
ASEAN. 
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international community should take cognizance of the principles of 
respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states.”45 Perhaps unsurprisingly 
then, it would be another fifteen years before ASEAN would take 
action to establish an ASEAN regional human rights mechanism by 
ratifying the ASEAN Charter.46 
III.  ASEAN’S EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISMS AND INSTRUMENTS 
A.  The ASEAN Charter and the Formation of the AICHR 
ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Charter in 2007, and 
it was subsequently ratified by all ten member states in 2008.47 As 
stated in the ASEAN Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005, the Charter 
“serve[s] as a legal and institutional framework of ASEAN” and 
“codif[ies] all ASEAN norms, rules, and values.”48 The adoption of 
the Charter was a watershed moment for ASEAN, as it turned “the 
hitherto loose ‘Association’ into a union consolidated by a legally 
binding treaty.”49 In effect, the Charter invested ASEAN with a legal 
identity independent from its member states, thereby giving the 
Association the legal capacity to act on behalf of the region.50 
The ASEAN Charter commits ASEAN to upholding human 
rights while conversely adding that such rights are to be considered in 
light of ASEAN’s principles of non-interference and state 
sovereignty.51 The Charter’s section delineating ASEAN’s 
“Principles” illustrates this conflicting duality: 
 
ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with 
the following Principles: 
 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Phan, supra note 3, at 3. 
 47. Ginbar, supra note 11, at 504. 
 48. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter 
(Dec. 12, 2005), http://asean.org/?static_post=kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-
the-asean-charter-kuala-lumpur-12-december-2005. 
 49. Ginbar, supra note 11, at 504. 
 50. Phan, supra note 3, at 103. 
 51. See ASEAN Charter art. 2. 
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(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN 
Member states;  
 
. . . . 
 
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN 
Member States; 
 
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its 
national existence free from external interference, subversion 
and coercion; 
 
. . . . 
 
(i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and 
protection of human rights, and the promotion of social 
justice; 
 
(j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international 
law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to 
by ASEAN Member States . . . .52 
 
The Charter further holds that the purpose of ASEAN is “[t]o 
strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, 
and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States 
of ASEAN.”53 As noted by Phan, the specific “rights and 
responsibilities” of states are not explained in the Charter, thus leaving 
the door open for human rights violations to be committed.54 By 
qualifying its human rights commitments against a commitment to 
state rights, the Charter undermines the universality and inalienable 
nature of human rights55 in a manner which is consistent with the 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added). 
 54. Phan, supra note 3, at 106. 
 55. Id. 
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“ASEAN Way” and shows vestiges of the so-called “Asian Values” 
arguments. 
Of particular importance, Article 14 of the Charter committed 
ASEAN to create a human rights body. The ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was 
created in 2009 and consists of ten members, each appointed as a 
representative by each one of the member states.56 The AICHR Terms 
of Reference commit the commission “[t]o promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of ASEAN,”57 
but the document is still dominated by the familiar “culture-rights 
juxtaposition” which qualifies human rights against member state 
rights for sovereignty and non-interference. 
For example, the document states that the AICHR must “promote 
human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind national 
and regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the 
balance between rights and responsibilities.”58 This echoes the ideas 
of state paternalism espoused by the “Asian Values” argument59 by 
implying that State and communal responsibility can outweigh and 
override individual human rights. 
The Terms of Reference commit the AICHR to promote human 
rights in a variety of ways, including by enhancing public awareness, 
initiating capacity building to implement international human rights 
treaty obligations, providing consultation and advisory services, and 
encouraging ASEAN states to ratify international human rights 
instruments. Notably, however, while promoting human rights is 
reiterated throughout the AICHR’s mandate and functions, means of 
actively protecting human rights are not addressed.60 The document 
does “not envisage the AICHR having any judicial mandate nor 
providing any legal channel for the receiving and considering of 
complaints concerning alleged violations of human rights by member-
States.”61 
 
 56. Wang, supra note 4, at 389. 
 57. ASEAN, ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (TERMS OF 
REFERENCE), 3 (2009) [hereinafter Terms of Reference] 
https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf. 
 58. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 59. Hoon, supra note 28, at 156–57. 
 60. See ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27. 
 61. Doyle, supra note 1, at 73. 
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Perhaps as a result, the AICHR faced wide criticism for its 
inability to act and has been given the moniker of being “toothless.”62 
For example, in an article entitled Asia’s Toothless Council, The Wall 
Street Journal noted: 
ASEAN’s commission will make decisions by consensus—
meaning authoritarian regimes like Burma, Laos and 
Vietnam can wield veto power. Individual governments can 
appoint or remove commissioners as they see fit. 
Independent observers aren’t included on the commission. It 
wouldn’t be surprising to see ASEAN’s misfits use the group 
as an excuse to whitewash their own human-rights 
violations . . . .63 
These concerns appear to have been founded. Indeed, the articles 
outlining basic principles in both the AICHR terms of reference and 
the ASEAN Charter place non-interference first and above conformity 
to human rights. 
B.  The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
In 2012, the AICHR appointed representatives from each member 
state to draft the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD or the 
“Declaration”).64 On its face, this seemed to be a big step for ASEAN 
towards becoming a regional enforcer of human rights.65 The existing 
regional human rights systems in Europe, Africa, and the Americas 
are made of three key components: first, and central to the entire 
system, a legally binding human rights convention which outlines 
human rights commitments for the region; second, a commission, 
 
 62. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF 
THE UNION, ASEAN CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: RULE OF LAW, JUDICIARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 
(2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433716/EXPO-
AFET_NT(2013)433716_EN.pdf (“The ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission 
(AICHR) is ‘toothless.’”); James Gomez & Robin Ramcharan, The Protection of Human Rights in 
Southeast Asia: Improving the Effectiveness of Civil Society, 13 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L., no. 
3, 2012, at 27 (“CSOs, who were sparingly consulted in the process of creation of the ASEAN 
Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights, have early on criticized its Terms of Reference 
(TORs) which provided for a ‘toothless’ mechanism that failed to provide for real ‘protection.’”); 
Asean’s Toothless Council, WALL STREET J.: OPINION (July 22, 2009 4:45 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203517304574303592053848748; Wang, 
supra note 4, at 392 (“Among commentators and human rights advocates, criticisms of the ASEAN 
Commission abound. It has been called ‘the world’s most toothless human-rights body,’
 
‘a lame 
duck,’
 
and mere ‘window dressing.’”). 
 63. Asean’s Toothless Council, supra note 62. 
 64. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 4. 
 65. Wang, supra note 4, at 396. 
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which monitors and applies the convention; and third, a court, which 
enforces obligations from the convention.66 With the AICHR in place, 
the AHRD had the potential of being the binding convention central 
to ASEAN’s regional human rights system. Unfortunately, the 
document fell short. 
The AHRD drew criticism from its very inception.67 The drafting 
process was controversial because it was largely done in secret and 
without any form of consultation outside of ASEAN.68 Civil society 
organizations (“CSOs”), who sought to provide input to the document, 
were kept out of the highly secretive drafting process.69 When finally 
adopted in 2012, the AHRD continued to disappoint.70 
The Declaration fails to recognize certain basic rights, such as the 
right to self-determination, the right of freedom of association, and the 
rights of indigenous peoples.71 Provisions within the AHRD also 
continue to espouse the idea of context-based rights, alluding that, 
under the appropriate circumstances, states do not have to adhere to 
human rights standards. 
For example, Article 7 of the AHRD, while stating that “[a]ll 
human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated,” adds that “[a]t the same time, the realisation of human 
rights must be considered in the regional and national context bearing 
in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical 
and religious backgrounds.”72 This clearly alludes to the “ASEAN 
Way” mentality and “leaves unresolved the awkward tension between 
the aspiration to endorse universal human rights and the reluctance to 
cede state sovereignty.”73 
 
 66. Id. at 401. 
 67. See, e.g., Coalition Slams Secrecy in Human Rights Declaration’s Drafting, JAKARTA 
GLOBE (June 12, 2012), http://jakartaglobe.id/archive/coalition-slams-secrecy-in-human-rights-
declarations-drafting/ (“‘The AICHR has really been secretive in dealing with a document that will 
impact the lives of the 580 million people who live in Asean,’ Yuyun told the Jakarta Globe on 
Sunday. She said that since July 21 when the first meeting of the drafting group was held, there had 
not been any consultations with stakeholders, including civil society representatives, victims of 
human rights violations or others. ‘There are grounds for suspicion and worries about the process,’ 
Yuyun said, adding that so far the AICHR had also never made any draft of the declaration public 
or even available to the stakeholders.”) 
 68. Wang, supra note 4, at 396. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 4. 
 71. Wang, supra note 4, at 396. 
 72. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 7. 
 73. Wang, supra note 4, at 397. 
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Perhaps the most problematic provision of the Declaration is in 
Article 8, which states: 
The human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person 
shall be exercised with due regard to the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others. The exercise of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others, and to meet the just 
requirements of national security, public order, public health, 
public safety, public morality, as well as the general welfare 
of the peoples in a democratic society.74 
Article 8 does not recognize a fundamental principle in international 
human rights law: that certain human rights, such as the right to 
freedom from slavery or torture, are inviolable and non-derogable 
under any circumstances.75 Instead, it implies that states can violate 
human rights in the name of “national security, public order, public 
health, public safety, public morality [and the] general welfare of the 
peoples.”76 This, in practice, gives states wide latitude to justify 
human rights abuses by claiming it is for the purposes of something as 
nondescript as “public morality.” 
As stated by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, “All 
rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. While 
international human rights law allows for legitimate limitations, 
derogations and reservations, they must be exercised under strict 
circumstances. Even in exceptional situations, certain core human 
rights must apply at all times.”77 Accordingly, while other 
international agreements have similar provisions for suspending 
individual rights in situations of national security and safety, these 
 
 74. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 8. 
 75. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 7. 
 76. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 8. 
 77. U.N. High Comm’r of Human Rights, OHCHR Research and Right to Dev. Div., Core 
Human Rights in the Two Covenants (Sept. 2013), https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/
Page%20Documents/Core%20Human%20Rights.pdf (listing examples of non-derogable human 
rights) (emphasis added); see U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues 
Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994). 
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provisions explicitly state that even in times of crisis, certain human 
rights may not be suspended.78 
Article 8 of the AHRD contains no such provision.79 Furthermore, 
the article lacks provisions to ensure that any suspension or restriction 
of human rights is 1) legal under international law; 2) implemented to 
satisfy legitimate aims; and 3) proportionate in scope to the need for 
the suspension or restriction.80 
For these reasons and more, the AHRD has drawn criticism from 
the international community. In response to the drafting of the AHRD, 
the UN Coordination Committee of the Special Procedures of the 
Human Rights Council (“UN Committee”) penned an open letter 
expressing their concern with the document.81 With regards to Article 
7, the UN Committee criticized the nature of this balancing of rights, 
asserting that “advocating a balance between human rights and duties 
creates much greater scope for Governments to place arbitrary, 
disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on human rights.”82 The 
UN Committee noted that “[t]here should be no such provision in a 
human rights instrument, whose primary purpose is to protect 
individuals and groups against the misuse and abuse of State power.”83 
The UN Committee also expressed concern over Article 8 of the 
AHRD, stating that “[w]ith regard to legitimate restrictions, under 
 
 78. See, e.g., Org. of Am. States [OAS], American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San 
Jose, Costa Rica (B-32) art. 27. Article 27(1) has a similar provision to Article 8 of the AHRD, 
stating that “[i]n time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or 
security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present 
Convention to the extent and the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law 
and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social 
origin.” Id. However, this provision is followed by Article 27(2), which cautions that “The 
foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to 
Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 
(Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of 
Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 
19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in 
Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 79. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 8. 
 80. Bui, supra note 22, at 128. 
 81. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Should Maintain International Standards, An Open 
Letter from the Coordination Committee of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council 
on the draft ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/
LetterASEAN_Nov2012.doc [hereinafter ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Should Maintain 
International Standards]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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certain conditions, on the grounds of ‘morality’, ‘public order’ and 
‘national security’, special procedures mandate holders are acutely 
aware of the risk of these terms being used as a pretext by 
Governments to place arbitrary, disproportionate and unnecessary 
restrictions on human rights.”84 
The American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative (“Rule of 
Law Initiative”) wrote a legal analysis of the AHRD shortly after it 
was drafted under the assumption “that ASEAN will eventually 
develop a regional human rights convention similar to the American, 
African and European Conventions, and that the AHRD will form the 
basis of such a Convention,”85 and also expressed concern over the 
omission of key human rights and limitations placed on human rights 
enforcement.86 The Rule of Law Initiative theorized that Article 7 may 
be an attempt to “infuse the AHRD with a regional flavour,” but noted 
that “the language raises some concerns.”87 They also noted that 
Article 8’s “limitation clause” could be used by member states to 
justify derogation from established human rights principles.88 
Both the UN Committee and the Rule of Law Initiative concluded 
that ASEAN must redraft the document with input from CSOs and 
others in the region, and ensure that the document better mandates 
compliance with international human rights laws.89 The Rule of Law 
Initiative added that before the AHRD can become a binding 
convention for the region, it must also establish “the machinery 
required to establish an effective treaty enforcement mechanism.”90 
C.  The Legal Effect of ASEAN Instruments and Mechanisms 
Thus far, all ASEAN human rights documents, including the 
ASEAN Charter, the AICHR Terms of Reference, and the AHRD, are 
non-binding on ASEAN states and constitute “soft law.”91 As such, 
these documents have recommendatory status and nothing more.92 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 2. 
 86. Id. at 7–8. 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Should Maintain International Standards, supra note 
81, at 2; AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 9. 
 90. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 9. 
 91. TAN HSIEN-LI, THE ASEAN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INSTITUTIONALISING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 177 (2011). 
 92. Id. 
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The AICHR itself is only a consultative intergovernmental body 
which, unlike other regional human rights commissions, does not 
receive, analyze, or investigate claims of human rights abuses.93 
Though the AICHR’s terms of reference decree that the AICHR must 
protect human rights, they lack a mandate to do more than conduct 
capacity building and awareness-raising initiatives.94 None of 
ASEAN’s human rights instruments or initiatives establish a 
complaints mechanism to allow for individuals to report human rights 
violations, nor do they posit a system for remedying for human rights 
abuses through any form of punishment on member states or human 
rights violators.95 
In practice, the AICHR’s activities have mainly taken the form of 
organizing conferences and seminars throughout the region related to 
human rights,96 while ASEAN and the AICHR have remained largely 
silent in the face of actual human rights abuses in the region.97 In fact, 
there is research to suggest that ASEAN has been as inactive in 
condemning and acting against human rights abuses since the 
formation of the AICHR as it was before the AICHR even existed.98 
Following a recent military coup in Thailand, the Thai military even 
lobbied ASEAN for support for their military regime and arbitrary 
exercises of power.99 
For a more recent example of ASEAN and the AICHR’s 
complacency towards human rights violations, one need look no 
further than the ongoing Rohingya crisis in ASEAN member state 
Myanmar. The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority from the 
Rakhine State, one of the poorest states in Myanmar.100 Though the 
Rohingya have faced discrimination for years at the hands of extremist 
and ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups,101 “the recent level of violence 
 
 93. Bui, supra note 22, at 131–32. 
 94. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE 
UNION, supra note 62. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Bui, supra note 22, at 118. 
 99. Id. at 117–18. 
 100. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims 
and Other Minorities in Myanmar, ¶ 9, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18 (June 28, 2016). 
 101. U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of OHCHR Mission to 
Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar Since 9 October 2016, 5 
(Feb. 3, 2017). 
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is unprecedented.”102 In what has been dubbed the “fastest growing 
refugee crisis in the world”103 and “the biggest humanitarian crisis that 
we’re facing right now in the 21st century,”104 the Rohingya 
population has been subject to “the killing of babies, toddlers, 
children, women and elderly; opening fire at people fleeing; burning 
of entire villages; massive detention; massive and systematic rape and 
sexual violence; [and] deliberate destruction of food and sources of 
food.”105 The violence and destruction has been perpetrated by the 
Myanmar Armed Forces, the Border Guard Police Force of Myanmar, 
police forces of Myanmar, and non-Rohingya Rakhine forces recently 
integrated into the security forces,106 and has resulted in over 600,000 
Rohingya fleeing to nearby countries such as Bangladesh for refuge.107 
With the exception of condemnation by Muslim-majority 
countries Malaysia and Indonesia, ASEAN has been predominantly 
silent in the face of this crisis.108 For example, at a 2017 ASEAN 
Summit meeting, the “Chairman’s Statement,” which provides a 
summation of the group’s discussions, did not even mention the 
Rohingya.109 The sole reference to the Rohingya crisis was a 
commendation for the delivery of relief items to “the affected 
communities in Northern Rakhine State, Myanmar.”110 Even the 
AICHR has failed to respond to the crisis.111 This is a glaring omission 
for a commission tasked with upholding human rights. 
 
 102. Id. at 41. 
 103. Muslimin, supra note 6. 
 104. Gotinga, supra note 6. 
 105. U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 101, at 41. 
 106. Id. at 11–12. 
 107. Southeast Asia Summit Draft Statement Skips Over Rohingya Crisis, supra note 6. 
 108. Muslimin, supra note 6. 
 109. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Chairman’s Statement of the Sixth Meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response and the Fifth Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management, ¶ 6, 
(Oct. 19, 2017), http://asean.org/storage/2017/10/Final-Chairmans-Statement-5th-AMMDM-6th-
COP-to-AADMER-19-Oct-2017.pdf. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Indah P. Amaritasari, ASEAN Rights Body Absent in Massacre of Rohingya JAKARTA 
POST (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:05 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/09/12/asean-
rights-body-absent-in-massacre-of-rohingya.html (“The absence of any effective response on the 
part of the AICHR toward human rights violations of international human rights law amounts to 
ASEAN perpetuating the culture of impunity of its member states. . . . The AICHR’s lack of 
response to the situation of human rights of the Rohingya can foster organized criminal abuse of 
state power. The ASEAN human rights system does not have any such system of interim, 
precautionary or provisional measures in place to protect victims or those at imminent risk of being 
victimized.”). 
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D.  The Council of ASEAN Chief Justices 
Despite its clear shortcomings, ASEAN has made progress 
towards unifying judicial practices and institutionalizing human rights 
norms within the domestic judiciaries of its member states. Given the 
aversion that ASEAN members have traditionally had for outside 
intervention and change, these initiatives represent an important step 
for human rights within the region. 
The Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ or the “Council”) 
was created in 2013, and has met annually since their inception.112 As 
indicated by the name, the Council is comprised of the Chief Justices 
and Heads of the ten ASEAN domestic judiciaries.113 The Council 
aims to establish “adherence to the rule of law and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, ensuring that ASEAN member 
states and denizens live in peace with the world at large in a just 
environment,”114 and delineated the following objectives at their 
initial meeting: 
 
(a) Promote close relations and mutual understanding 
amongst the ASEAN judiciaries; 
 
(b) Provide a regular forum for the ASEAN Chief Justices to 
discuss and exchange views on common issues facing the 
ASEAN judiciaries; and 
 
(c) Facilitate judicial cooperation and collaboration among 
ASEAN judiciaries with a view to accelerate the economic 
growth and development of the ASEAN region.115 
 
The CACJ submitted formal accreditation documentation to the 
ASEAN Secretary-General in 2016,116 and became an official entity 
of ASEAN in January 2017 when the CACJ was added to Annex 2 of 
the ASEAN Charter.117 
 
 112. Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ), supra note 4. 
 113. Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See ASEAN Chief Justices Meet in Brunei, PEOPLE’S ARMY NEWSPAPER (Mar. 25, 2017), 
http://en.qdnd.vn/asean-community/asean-news/asean-chief-justices-meet-in-brunei-479361. 
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The CACJ has already taken several initiatives towards 
integrating judiciaries in ASEAN. At the third CACJ meeting in 2015, 
the Council pledged to create an English-language portal of laws 
across the region.118 It is hoped that this portal will create more 
transparent judicial processes in the region and delineate 
understandable court regulations for litigants.119 This portal, which is 
expected to be up and running by 2018, will be sponsored by the 
Norwegian government.120 Additionally, each country has agreed to 
submit a report on legal regulations of civil procedure in their 
respective countries so that the Council’s working group can design a 
“model law” to serve as a reference for all member countries.121 
Countries will also submit reports on their case management 
procedures for the CACJ working group to create a referential 
procedure.122 
Beyond unifying laws, the CACJ also seeks to integrate and 
enhance judicial training in the region. A working group headed by 
Indonesia and the Philippines has conducted annual workshops for 
ASEAN judges on various topics of the law, the third of which was 
held in 2017 and focused on international human rights.123 Currently, 
few ASEAN countries train their judges on ASEAN instruments or 
international law. This relatively new initiative may significantly help 
increase awareness of international law norms (including international 
human rights law norms) amongst ASEAN members. 
The CACJ collaborated with the AICHR to host the Judicial 
Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding International 
Human Rights Law (the “Colloquium”) in March of 2017.124 The 
Colloquium “aimed to strengthen judicial cooperation and encourage 
greater peer-to-peer interaction between relevant stakeholders, and to 
provide a platform to share good practices and challenges in the 
 
 118. ‘Rule of Law Must Prevail as ASEAN Integrates’, RAPPLER (Mar. 3, 2015, 8:57 PM), 
https://www.rappler.com/video/reports/85669-rule-of-law-asean-integration. 
 119. Buena Bernal, SC: Efficient Courts Vital to ASEAN Integration, RAPPLER (Mar. 1, 2015, 
6:20 PM), https://www.rappler.com/nation/85403-sc-court-vital-asean-integration. 
 120. ASEAN Chief Justices Meet in Brunei, supra note 117. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ), supra note 4. 
 124. ASEAN Shares Good Practices on International Human Rights Law, ASEAN 
SECRETARIAT NEWS, (Mar. 20, 2017), http://asean.org/asean-shares-good-practices-on-
international-human-rights-law/. 
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implementation of international human rights laws in ASEAN.”125 
Participants at the conference discussed ways in which to implement 
the AHRD in the region.126 
In his opening speech, the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Malaysia stated that, “[t]he Judiciaries’ discussion 
on international and regional instruments in the Colloquium will serve 
to advance a greater understanding and acceptance of human rights 
norms in the region,” and further emphasized the key role played by 
the judiciary in serving as a means of check and balance on other 
branches of government.127 
The three-day conference closed with the adoption of the 
Colloquium’s Conclusions and Recommendations for the AICHR.128 
These include: 
(1) conduct capacity-building programmes; (2) conduct 
greater peer-to-peer interaction between relevant 
stakeholders; (3) compile a regional reference guide in 
respect of the AHRD, CEDAW, CRC, CRPD, and the role of 
the judiciary in the promotion and protection of the rule of 
law and human rights; (4) enhance effective access to justice 
and legal remedies by strengthening the provision of legal aid 
in the region; and (5) consult and/or collaborate with other 
ASEAN bodies and entities associated with ASEAN, 
including civil society organisations, to realise these 
recommendations.129 
While these initiatives all represent substantial strides for 
ASEAN, they are not being fully embraced without hesitation. For 
example, at the 2017 annual CACJ meeting held after the 
 
 125. AICHR’s First Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding 
International Human Rights Law, HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (Mar. 15, 2017), 
http://hrrca.org/aichrs-first-judicial-colloquium-on-the-sharing-of-good-practices-regarding-
international-human-rights-law/. 
 126. Press Release: AICHR Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding 
International Human Rights Law 13-15 March 2017, ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS. (Mar. 17, 2017), http://aichr.org/press-release/press-release-aichr-
judicial-colloquium-on-the-sharing-of-good-practices-regarding-international-human-rights-law-
13-15-march-2017/. 
 127. AICHR’s First Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding 
International Human Rights Law, supra note 125. 
 128. Press Release: AICHR Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding 
International Human Rights Law 13-15 March 2017, supra note 126. 
 129. AICHR’s First Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding 
International Human Rights Law, supra note 125. 
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AICHR/CACJ Colloquium, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Brunei stated: 
“We must keep an open mind on the issues that we could and 
should discuss. If an area of focus is brought to our attention, 
it is our duty to consider whether it is proper for us to make 
it a part of the council’s work. For example, the recent 
[AICHR] Judicial Colloquium on the sharing of Good 
Practices Regarding International Human Rights Law in 
Kuala Lumpur sought greater cooperation between the 
AICHR and the Council on issues of human rights law. The 
question we must answer is whether this is the appropriate 
forum for such an issue to be discussed.”130 
The Chief Justice of the Philippines has also expressed some hesitation 
regarding unifying and integrating laws across the region. She 
explained that this may be complicated in light of existing structural 
systems between the countries,131 stating, “even explaining how 
processes work takes time,” and that the Philippines itself is “still 
grappling with the question of our own jurisdiction.”132 
Regardless of existing hesitation towards integration and 
implementation of human rights law in the region, the work of the 
CACJ is significant. By sharing practices, integrating laws, and 
teaching international human rights norms, the CACJ can strengthen 
domestic judiciaries, which can, in turn, ensure better means of redress 
for domestic human rights violations. The very fact that justices from 
the highest courts of member states are discussing human rights laws 
is an important step for ASEAN and highlights the ways in which 
human rights norms are beginning to gain more acceptance within the 
region. What remains is figuring out how to apply this momentum 
towards overcoming principles of non-interference under the 
“ASEAN Way” to create a legal mechanism to redress human rights 
abuses. 
 
 130. James Kon, Brunei Hosts Asean Chief Justices’ Meet, BORNEO 
BULLETIN (Mar. 25, 2017), https://borneobulletin.com.bn/brunei-hosts-asean-chief-justices-meet/. 
 131. Buena Bernal, ASEAN Chief Justices Sign Accord for Judicial Cooperation, RAPPLER 
(Mar. 9, 2015, 11:25PM), https://www.rappler.com/nation/85990-asean-chief-justices-accord. 
 132. Buena Bernal, Sereno: Long Way to Go for Liberalized Legal Profession, RAPPLER 
(Mar. 2, 2015, 11:59 AM), https://www.rappler.com/nation/85481-sereno-liberalized-legal-
profession. 
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IV.  CREATING AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM 
IN ASEAN AND THE STRENGTHS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTIONS 
A. Progressive Implementation of Human Rights Mechanisms 
Yvonne Xin Wang noted in her 2015 article Contextualizing 
Universal Human Rights: An Integrated Human Rights Framework 
for ASEAN that many of the existing human rights systems took an 
incremental approach towards establishing a concrete regional human 
rights mechanism complete with a convention, a commission, and a 
court.133 In fact, none of these regional systems adopted all three 
instruments at once, instead taking years between introducing each 
new instrument before culminating in the implementation of the 
strongest human rights instrument of all—human rights court.134 The 
African Charter, for example, which established the African 
Commission, was created 18 years after the Organization of African 
Unity (now known as the African Union) was first formed.135 The 
Charter came into force in 1986,136 and, after much reluctance on the 
part of the member states, the African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights was created in 1998.137 
Wang posits that a progressive approach would particularly suit 
ASEAN, even at the cost of waiting for stronger human rights 
mechanisms to be implemented: 
Given ASEAN’s resistance towards adversarial or coercive 
intrusions into state sovereignty and a lack of political will 
for establishing binding enforcement mechanisms, the 
ASEAN Commission should start by engaging governments 
using mechanisms that appear least intrusive to state 
sovereignty. Some may argue that we should not give up on 
pushing for stronger mechanisms just because it is politically 
difficult. Indeed, material inducements signal that the 
community condemns the proscribed behavior, and the 
absence of punishment might signal that the community does 
not strongly support the norm. However, this expressive 
 
 133. Wang, supra note 4, at 401–02. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 402. 
 136. Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the Gap?: The Role of Regional and National Human Rights 
Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13 ASIA-PAC. L. & POL’Y J., no. 1, 2011, at 174, 188. 
 137. Id. at 190. 
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value of punishment might work only when the proscribed 
behavior is already “broadly, unequivocally, and manifestly 
understood as inappropriate.”
 
Premature punishment, prior 
to the institutionalization of a norm, “can also result in a 
(greater) backlash by norm violators who feel unjustly 
penalized.”138 
Thus, by first implementing less intrusive steps, with the ultimate 
goal of establishing a regional human rights court, ASEAN can ensure 
that their initiatives will be met with the political will and level of 
social acceptance necessary for such instruments to be successful. 
ASEAN states, long known for their reluctance to acquiesce to outside 
intervention, would be far more apt to accept measures incrementally. 
One such measure is the implementation of ADR proceedings. 
Studies indicate that ADR has had great successes as a means of 
conflict resolution in Southeast Asia,139 and may be a form of 
resolution better suited for parties less receptive to outside 
intervention.140 Additionally, instituting a mechanism for ADR is 
feasible in the short-term, as existing ASEAN instruments already 
have provisions in place for utilizing ADR. 
B.  Alternative Dispute Resolutions 
In the case of ASEAN, where high importance is placed on 
respect for the internal affairs of other members, non-confrontation, 
quiet diplomacy, non-recourse to use or threat to use of force, and 
decision-making through consensus,141 traditional forms of 
adversarial judicial processes may not be best suited to address every 
conflict. With these values in mind, it also seems unlikely that member 
states would respond enthusiastically to being taken to court by an 
outside regional body and made to litigate their disputes in the near 
future. 
 
 138. Wang, supra note 4, at 407 (footnotes omitted). 
 139. See, e.g., Joel Lee, Culture and Its Importance in Mediation, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
317, 324–25 (2016) (discussing how mediation has been used for dispute resolution in Singapore); 
Sorawit Limparangsri & Prachya Yuprasert, Arbitration and Mediation in ASEAN: Laws and 
Practice from a Thai Perspective, ASEAN LAW ASSOCIATION 
https://www.aseanlawassociation.org/docs/w4_thai.pdf (“Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has 
been in existence in Thailand, at least, since Thai history was first recorded in writing. Pursuing an 
amicable solution to a dispute will come as a natural choice once Thai people confront a dispute.”). 
 140. See Lorna McGregor, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a 
Rights-Based Approach Through the ECHR, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 607, 612 (2015). 
 141. Phan, supra note 3, at 113. 
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ADR presents a promising alternate means of conflict resolution 
for ASEAN states. ADR refers to “processes other than a judicial 
determination, in which a third person assists parties to resolve a 
dispute.”142 Settling disputes through ADR “increases the chances of 
preserving continuing relationships . . . both personal and commercial 
as well as protecting reputations.”143 Characteristics of ADR “such as 
‘consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy and 
emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, 
access, and. . . justice’”144 align with many characteristics of the 
ASEAN Way such as consensus, autonomy, and quiet diplomacy. 
As a means of dispute settlement, ADR seems well-suited for 
ASEAN countries—ADR is known for its successes in dispute 
resolutions in multi-cultural communities145 and some even argue that 
mediation has its roots in Asian culture.146 In fact, ASEAN has 
developed a dispute settlement mechanism utilizing ADR for 
economic disputes,147 and ADR is already successfully used by 
member states for the negotiation of business-related conflicts.148 
1.  An Overview of ADR 
In ADR processes, the role of the neutral third party can vary 
depending on the form of dispute resolution used and generally falls 
between two categories. In evaluative (also known as “determinative”) 
forms of ADR “the ADR practitioner has a role in investigating the 
dispute, which may also include the hearing of formal evidence, and 
determining a resolution which may be internally enforceable, 
externally enforceable or unenforceable.”149 A common form of 
determinative ADR is arbitration,150 where the arbiter hears evidence 
 
 142. TRACEY RAYMOND, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW CONTEXT 2 (2006), 
http://www.asiapacificmediationforum.org/resources/2006/raymond.pdf. 
 143. McGregor, supra note 140, at 612 (footnotes omitted). 
 144. Id. (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases) 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669–70 (1995)). 
 145. Nancy Erbe, The Global Popularity and Promise of Facilitative ADR, 18 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 343, 346 (2004). 
 146. Lee, supra note 139, at 325. 
 147. See ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism art. 1 (June 18, 2012), 
http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20141217102933.pdf. 
 148. See Marquise Clarke, Successfully Resolving Commercial Disputes: An Overview of 
Arbitration in ASEAN, ASEAN Briefing (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2016/06/28/asean-arbitration.html. 
 149. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 3. 
 150. Id. 
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from both sides in order to decide an outcome which may or may not 
be binding upon the parties.151 
In contrast, in facilitative ADR processes the “third party’s 
intervention relates to the process of resolution rather than the content 
of the dispute or the terms of its resolution.”152 Thus, the neutral third 
party guiding the resolution functions less as a trier-of-fact and more 
as a facilitator to communications. The most common form of 
facilitative ADR is mediation, in which the mediator fosters 
communication between parties in order to reach a non-binding 
settlement mutually agreed to by all.153 
In practice, “ADR processes may also be classified as hybrid or 
combined processes.”154 For example, differences between varieties 
of “hybrid models and the many variants within each model[] 
includ[e] whether engagement is voluntary or mandatory; . . . whether 
it is integrated into the judicial system; whether the decisions reached 
are binding; [and] whether the process is public or private.”155 
ADR proceedings can be kept confidential, though critics argue 
that a lack of transparency “may limit the social reforming potential 
of the law and work to the disadvantage of those the law aims to 
protect.”156 Proponents, however, argue that “ADR[] is championed 
on grounds that it advances self-determination and autonomy and 
empowers parties to ‘control the outcome’. On this justification, the 
major critiques of arbitration—for example, its privacy and 
confidentiality—are seen as advantages to party choice and control of 
the dispute.”157 
Differences may also exist in whether ADR processes are 
interest-based or rights-based. In interest-based ADR, a resolution is 
sought which reflects the underlying needs and interests of the parties 
in question.158 In rights-based ADR, the resolution is implemented 
“with reference to perceived rights and duties for example, as 
articulated in law.”159 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See ADR Types & Benefits, CAL. CTS.: THE JUD. BRANCH OF CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/3074.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
 154. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 3. 
 155. McGregor, supra note 140, at 615 (footnotes omitted). 
 156. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 2. 
 157. McGregor, supra note 140, at 612 (footnotes omitted). 
 158. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 7. 
 159. Id. 
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2.  Models of ADR Best Suited Under the “ASEAN Way” and 
Human Rights Enforcement 
As noted by Tracey Raymond, Principal Training and Policy 
Officer and Principal Investigation/Conciliation Officer with the 
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ADR 
in the human right’s context should, at least in part, be rights-based.160 
The ADR facilitator in human rights conflicts would have to consider 
the relevant human rights laws and how other disputes have been 
handled by courts or tribunals.161 
A solely rights-based approach, however, may not be the answer. 
Disadvantages of a rights-based resolution process include the fact 
that, in more closely mirroring traditional judicial processes, 
resolutions typically focus more on customary forms of remedy such 
as restitution.162 In doing so, more creative or meaningful outcomes 
for the parties are not explored.163 In addition, rights-based ADR “can 
include competitive, adversarial negotiation techniques which can be 
detrimental to any ongoing relationship between the parties and can 
intensify and entrench conflict.”164 
As many ASEAN states value autonomy, non-interference, quiet 
diplomacy and consensus,165 they may not be receptive to an overly 
adversarial rights-based form of ADR. Raymond argues, however, 
that “within this rights-based framework there is a place for the 
philosophy and skills associated with interest-based ADR.”166 She 
notes that there are numerous advantages to having more facilitative 
or interest-based negotiations: 
The role of the third party in an interest-based approach is 
characterised by interventions which elicit the needs and 
interests of both parties, encourage parties to understand each 
other’s views and aim to maintain constructive dialogue 
through which the parties can generate creative resolution 
options to address mutual needs and interests. An interest-
based approach to resolution is seen to contribute to 
maintenance of relationships, encourage an appreciation of 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Phan, supra note 3, at 113. 
 166. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 7. 
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different perspectives, educate parties about alternative ways 
to deal with conflict and increase the potential for 
resolution.167 
Raymond postulates that ADR for human rights disputes should 
incorporate aspects of both interest-based and rights-based ADR.168 
For example, interest-based approaches may be best suited for dealing 
with impasses within negotiations, while a focus on rights may be 
better suited at later stages in negotiation, particularly if interest-based 
ADR has been less successful.169 
In a survey of ADR initiatives in the Balkans, Cameroon, Nepal 
and the Ukraine, Fulbright Distinguished Chair and conflict resolution 
expert Nancy Erbe also advocates for a somewhat hybridized version 
of ADR.170 Respondents identified that “critical blocks to international 
development include predominance of the evaluative, or expert, 
approach, along with failure to facilitate effective partnerships with 
communities.”171 Instead, Erbe recommends a facilitative ADR 
approach but with a directive mediator: “the most popular leaders of 
cross-cultural processes are portrayed as balancing receptivity and 
rapport with assertive direction. Respondents from several regions 
mention direct, detailed questioning as important to careful 
listening.”172 
Erbe notes that ADR is particularly well-suited for “transitional 
and emerging democracies, where the rule of law and legal institutions 
require capacity building.”173 In surveying 115 respondents who 
engaged in ADR because of ethnic conflicts in Nepal, the Balkans, 
Cameroon, and the Ukraine, she found that ADR is particularly 
effective at empowering and giving voice to “communit[ies] in the 
face of corrupt and self-interested political leadership.”174 She also 
found that “additional interventions that are different from, but 
complementary to trials, such as facilitating culturally accepted 
mechanisms of justice should be considered . . . [S]ocial 
reconstruction may not occur when people are faced with judicial 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 8. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Erbe, supra note 145, at 369–70. 
 171. Id. at 355. 
 172. Id. at 370. 
 173. Id. at 358. 
 174. Id. 
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decisions that do not correspond to their perceptions of what 
happened, i.e., their ‘truth.’”175 
In an article discussing ADR initiatives in Singapore (where ADR 
has been used since 1994 in forums including courts and community 
mediation centers set up by the Ministry of Justice),176 anthropologist 
Dr. Joel Lee notes that “it was possible to preserve the usefulness of 
the interests-based model of conflict resolution—its functional 
paradigm—and harmonize it with the culture of Singapore in its 
application—its operational paradigm.”177 He posits that ADR 
practitioners can “contextualize the interests-based model for their 
own cultures.”178 
In Singapore, for example, interest-based ADR emphasizes social 
hierarchy, in that the mediator has high social status, is at the center of 
the mediation process, and provides guidance to the parties.179 The 
processes prioritize observing group interests alongside self-
interest.180 Communications and conduct emphasize preserving 
harmony and relationships—this includes steering away from 
uncomfortable topics when needed, as “[u]nearthing issues that should 
be left unspoken may lead to embarrassment and disengagement from 
the process.”181 
Lee rejects the notion that certain values can automatically be 
prescribed to Asian or “Eastern” versus “Western” countries,182 and 
also advocates for interest-based but context-driven ADR: 
[W]here the circumstances call for it, it is possible to 
manifest the interests-based model in a less facilitative, if not 
non-facilitative, manner. In fact, one could even practice 
directive/authoritative (not authoritarian) interests-based 
mediation. It should be made clear that this means that 
mediators may take on more of a leadership role but without 
depriving parties of their power to decide how to resolve the 
dispute.183 
 
 175. Id. at 355–356 (alterations in original). 
 176. Lee, supra note 139, at 324. 
 177. Id. at 328. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 328–29. 
 181. Id. at 329. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 331. 
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ADR provides a strong choice for dispute resolution of human 
rights issues for ASEAN because of its flexibility (i.e., it can be 
tailored to suit the conflict and parties in question) and because of its 
strength in conflicts involving multicultural parties. It is also a realistic 
option for ASEAN, as the ASEAN Charter already contains provisions 
for utilization of ADR to resolve conflicts.184 
3.  ADR within the ASEAN Legal Instruments 
Ideally, ADR would be a preliminary means of dispute resolution 
for citizens of ASEAN states. Once ASEAN has developed a regional 
human rights court and states have come to accept its jurisdiction, 
disputes unresolved through ADR could be transferred to the court for 
binding adjudication. 
Existing ASEAN instruments have mechanisms which call for 
ADR in dispute resolution.185 As outlined below, some minor changes 
to ASEAN instruments, coupled with the development of ASEAN 
organizations, would establish ADR as a means of dispute resolution 
and help lay the groundwork for the development of a regional human 
rights court. 
Article 24 of the ASEAN Charter, entitled “Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms in Specific Instruments” mandates that “[d]isputes 
relating to specific ASEAN instruments shall be settled through the 
mechanisms and procedures provided for in such instruments.”186 
Neither the AICHR terms of reference nor the AHRD, however, 
provide for a dispute settlement mechanism in the event of a violation 
of the AHRD.187 Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter addresses ASEAN 
instruments which do not themselves provide for dispute settlement, 
stating: “Where not otherwise specifically provided, appropriate 
dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, shall be 
established for disputes which concern the interpretation or 
application of this Charter and other ASEAN instruments.”188 The 
question of how such dispute settlement mechanisms are to be 
established remains unanswered. 
 
 184. ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 23–28. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. at art. 24. 
 187. See Terms of Reference, supra note 57. 
 188. ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 25. 
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In 2011, ASEAN created the ASEAN Institute for Peace and 
Reconciliation (AIPR).189 This organization shows promise to be a 
future resource for the AICHR to facilitate dispute resolution in the 
event that a complaint arises regarding a human rights violation.190 
Unfortunately, however, the AIPR “is still in its formative stage”191 
and has been largely inactive since its establishment. Though the 
organization has conducted a number of capacity-building symposia 
on a range of peace-related topics,192 the AIPR still lacks a website 
and only just instituted an Executive Director in October of 2017.193 It 
is clear that the AIPR needs to progress as an organization and develop 
an expertise in ADR before becoming a realistic resource in dispute 
resolution. 
In the event that ADR does become utilized to resolve human 
rights abuses in the region, Article 27 of the ASEAN Charter provides 
a means of ensuring compliance with the finding, recommendation, or 
decision found through the dispute resolution.194 Article 27 reads: 
 
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN 
Secretariat or any other designated ASEAN body, shall 
monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations 
or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement 
mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit. 
 
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the 
findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from 
an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the 
matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision.195 
 
 
 189. Elizabeth P. Buensuceso, The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and Its Role 
in Preventing Crises, UN CHRONICLE (Oct. 2017) https://unchronicle.un.org/article/asean-
institute-peace-and-reconciliation-and-its-role-preventing-crises. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. ASEAN Welcomes First Executive Director of AIPR, ASEAN: ASEAN SECRETARIAT 
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2017), http://asean.org/asean-welcomes-first-executive-director-of-aipr/. 
 194. Hao Duy Phan, Procedures for Peace: Building Mechanisms for Dispute Settlement and 
Conflict Management Within ASEAN, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 57 (2013). 
 195. ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 27. 
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Article 26 states that any unresolved disputes should also be referred 
to the Summit for a decision.196 
The ASEAN Summit is comprised of the Heads of State or 
Government from each member state, and serves as the “supreme 
policy-making body of ASEAN.”197 As noted by Phan, the “ASEAN 
Summit is not a court or an arbitral tribunal. It is a policy-making body 
that continues to operate according to the ASEAN Way, including, 
most importantly, the norm of decision-making on a consensus 
basis.”198 Unfortunately, this consensus-based decision-making 
process means that if any of the parties do not agree with a 
determination, no decision can be reached.199 
This is where an ASEAN Court, once established, could come 
into play. Article 26 should refer unresolved conflicts to the regional 
court. A court could also ensure compliance under Article 27, by 
issuing orders and punishments for any party’s failure to adhere to 
binding decisions. A court could also serve as the next step in the event 
that ADR fails to settle a dispute. In this regard, Wang proposes that 
ASEAN follow the actions of the Inter-American System: 
For the Inter-American System, states are incentivized to use 
[mediation] and reach an agreement. Failure to settle in 
mediation would allow the Commission to take stronger 
actions, such as publishing detailed public reports and non-
binding recommendations, or referring the dispute to the 
Inter-American Court, if the state has accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.
 
The potential for private settlements makes 
mediation more palatable than the following mechanisms, 
which involve public shaming or formal adjudication.200 
Such an approach makes sense and would allow for ADR initiatives 
to serve as a natural step in the dispute settlement process once a 
human rights court has been created. 
 
 196. Id. at art. 26. 
 197. Id. at art. 7. 
 198. Phan, supra note 194, at 57 (footnotes omitted). 
 199. See id. at 57–58. 
 200. See Wang, supra note 4, at 414 (footnotes omitted). 
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4.  The Case for a Human Rights Court, and Its Role Within ASEAN 
and with ADR Initiatives 
To be clear, this Note does not propose that changing ASEAN’s 
legal instruments and implementing ADR initiatives is the ultimate 
solution for ASEAN. A regional human rights court is absolutely 
necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of human rights in the 
Southeast Asian region.201 Strengthening the AICHR’s mandates 
alone would not adequately provide the legal force needed to provide 
redress for human rights violations as “even if the AICHR had 
stronger protection mandates, it could not replace the role of a court 
because only courts are able to provide legally binding decisions.”202 
The same stands true for ADR initiatives. If ADR proceedings 
rendered a nonbinding decision which was not followed by one or both 
parties involved in the dispute, as mentioned above, a court could 
function as an “appellate” forum where a binding decision could be 
reached.203 In short, “courts provide effective and enforceable 
remedies.”204 
Ideally, a court would function as an independent organ of the 
ASEAN human rights architecture. Such is the case in the regional 
human rights system in the Americas: “While the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) undertakes ‘monitoring and 
promotional activities’, including the selection and submission of 
cases to the Court, the Court issues binding decisions and advisory 
opinions to protect rights in danger.”205 
ASEAN would still play a role in supervising and ensuring 
execution of court decisions. In both the European and African human 
rights mechanisms, the court is monitored and supervised respectively 
by the Council of Europe and the Executive Council.206 As the 
established overarching regional organization, ASEAN would have 
the power and influence needed amongst its members to ensure that 
all Court decisions were properly executed and complied with. 
 
 201. See Bui, supra note 22, at 135 (“[T]he most pressing rationale for an ASEAN human rights 
court remains to provide adequate remedies for victims of human rights violations, something 
which cannot be accomplished by other means.”). 
 202. Id. at 134. 
 203. See Wang, supra note 4, at 414. 
 204. Bui, supra note 22, at 134. 
 205. Id. at 136. 
 206. Id. 
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The AICHR, too, would have a role to play by receiving 
complaints and investigating human rights violations. In the African 
and Inter-American human rights systems, the human rights 
commission receives complaints from individuals and, once they pass 
the “admissibility phase and merits phase,” the commission passes the 
complaints to the court for adjudication.207 Both organizations have 
mandates which allow for them to contact states and investigate 
human rights complaints.208 To fit into the regional human rights 
system, then, the AICHR would need to add a similar mandate to their 
Terms of Reference which would allow them to “receive information, 
communicate with governments, and undertake investigations.”209 
V.  CONCLUSION 
ASEAN has many of the tools it needs to progress towards 
creating an integrated regional human rights system. It has already 
undertaken initiatives to improve domestic laws, has provisions for 
ADR initiatives to settle disputes, and, most importantly, has set up a 
commission and declaration for human rights.210 ASEAN’s 
instruments, while concerning in their adherence to traditional ideals 
of the “ASEAN Way,” need only be modified to create the groundwork 
through which human rights laws can be enforced. The missing key 
ingredient is an organ for human rights enforcement. 
As noted by Bui, “it is probably fair to admit that the formation 
of a strong judicial mechanism in any form would be premature, given 
the current stage of ASEAN’s development.”211 ADR represents a 
feasible and more approachable solution for ASEAN until they gain 
the member state support they need to establish a human rights court. 
ASEAN states, who remain reluctant to cede their sovereignty to 
external intervention, would be more apt to accept ADR because of its 
flexible, less intrusive nature.212 ADR proceedings can be shaped 
depending on the cultural environment and context within a given 
dispute, and, as such, are well-suited for cross-cultural conflicts and 
 
 207. Phan, supra note 3, at 197. 
 208. See Bui, supra note 22, at 132; Mandates and Functions of the Commission, INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS., http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/functions.asp (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 209. Bui, supra note 22, at 132. 
 210. See ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, supra note 8, at 11. 
 211. Bui, supra note 22, at 133. 
 212. See Phan, supra note 194, at 53. 
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negotiations with reluctant parties.213 If successfully implemented, 
ADR initiatives would also help ASEAN states warm up to the idea of 
regional human rights enforcement, bringing them closer to initiating 
and accepting a human rights court.214 
In the short-term, implementation of ADR processes would 
provide a means for individuals in ASEAN states to report and address 
human rights violations.215 In the long-term, once a human rights court 
has been established, ADR would still have an important role to play. 
ADR can function both as the initial step in conflict resolution before 
turning to binding adjudication in court, and as an alternative 
procedure for conflict resolution for states or individuals who do not 
want to accept the court’s jurisdiction, or for conflicts better suited for 
ADR’s flexible, culture- and context-driven structure.216 
Considering that ASEAN has progressed from decades of stoutly 
resisting human rights initiatives to more recently creating a human 
rights commission and mechanisms to unify legal frameworks 
between ASEAN countries, the organization is clearly capable of and 
in the process of enacting great change. Human rights norms have 
become more accepted by ASEAN states, and will continue to gain 
prominence in the Association’s eyes. As such, the question of a 
human rights court is less of an “if,” and more of a “when” and “how.” 
On the road to forming a human rights court, ASEAN still has 
work to do. Following the “incremental approach,” ASEAN must 
strengthen the AICHR’s protection mandate and modify their legal 
instruments to recognize the non-derogable nature of key international 
human rights laws.217 ASEAN should also implement ADR 
proceedings for victims of human rights violations. All of these steps 
will help institutionalize human rights norms within the region and 
open the door towards establishing a much-needed regional human 
rights court. 
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